This volume of essays examines the psychological processes that underlie judicial decision making. Chapters in the first section of the book take as their starting point the fact that judges make many of the same judgments and decisions that ordinary people make and consider how our knowledge about judgment and decision-making in general applies to the case of legal judges. Chapters in the second section focus on the specific tasks that judges perform within a unique social setting and examine the expertise and particular modes of reasoning that judges develop to deal with their tasks in this unique setting. Chapters in the third section raise questions about whether and how we can evaluate judicial performance, with implications for the possibility of improving judging through the selection and training of judges and structuring of judicial institutions. Together the essays apply a wide range of psychological insights to help us better understand how judges make decisions and to open new avenues of inquiry into the influences on judicial behavior. It is often thought that if an adaptationist explanation of some behavioural phenomenon is true, then this fact shows that a culturist explanation of the very same phenomenon is false, or else the adaptationist explanation preempts or crowds out the culturist explanation in some way. This chapter shows why this so-called Page 2 of 7 competition thesis is misguided. Two evolutionary models are identified -the Information Learning Model and the Strategic Learning Modelwhich show that adaptationist reasoning can help explain why cultural learning evolved. These models suggest that there will typically be a division of labor between adaptationist and culturist explanations. It is then shown that the Strategic Learning Model, which has been widely neglected by adaptationist thinkers, has important and underappreciated implications for a question that has long been contentious in the behavioural sciences -the question of the malleability of human nature. This chapter analyzes judicial decision making from the perspective of motivation. Students of judicial behavior have focused on judges' motivations, but their inquiries into motivation could be broader and deeper. The chapter presents four issues on which scholarship in psychology can enhance our understanding of judges' motivations: the linkage between proximate goals (such as achieving good public policy) and more fundamental motivations, the energizing dimension of motivation (the level of effort devoted to a task), variation in motivation across judges and situations, and the relationship between motivation and cognition. The chapter concludes by considering the implications of its inquiry into motivation for the key questions in the study of judicial behavior, including the relative importance of legal and policy considerations in judges' decision making and the extent to which judges behave strategically. This chapter addresses the conceptual challenge posed by Europeanisation by reflecting on the utility of the existing goodnessof-fit model for exploring domestic adaptation aimed at uploading national policy preferences onto the European Union (EU) arena. It argues that the goodness-of-fit model is ill-suited to conceptualising strategic adaptation to EU membership: that is, the reform of national policy-making processes for the purpose of enhancing the coordination and projection of national EU policy. As an alternative to the conventional goodness-of-fit model, the chapter proposes an innovative strategic-projection model that sought to delineate between four modes of Europeanisation: the effective obligation of membership, differential empowerment and strategic adaptation within government, administrative transfer through intergovernmental learning, and the desire to maximise the compatibility of domestic and EU structures. This chapter presents the authors' theory of consensus and explicates how they propose to measure the central concepts that comprise their model. They argue that the key to understanding consensus is recognizing the diverse set of factors that work together to affect the justices in each case. Broadly, these forces are attitudinal, legal, strategic, institutional, and case-specific; suggesting each operates simultaneously to whether the Court is able to achieve consensus. In addition, the authors offer a mechanism for capturing law -a Legal Certainty Index -in an effort to test for its effects on judicial decision making and the achievement of consensus.
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Motivation and Judicial
Closing the Jaws of the Decision Making Vise This chapter presents the authors' theory of consensus and explicates how they propose to measure the central concepts that comprise their model. They argue that the key to understanding consensus is recognizing the diverse set of factors that work together to affect the justices in each case. Broadly, these forces are attitudinal, legal, strategic, institutional, and case-specific; suggesting each operates simultaneously to whether the Court is able to achieve consensus. In addition, the authors offer a mechanism for capturing law -a Legal Certainty Index -in an effort to test for its effects on judicial decision making and the achievement of consensus.
Philosophical approach to population modeling This chapter describes how we can use models, and how complex models should be. It begins with the difference between strategic and tactical population models. It describes the logic underlying both the scientific and the practical use of models, which corresponds with implementing deductive and inductive logic, respectively. Both approaches demand the ability to compare the structure of the model to the real world, that is, realism. Providing realism requires precisely defining the state of a system, that is, the information necessary to project the state of that system from one time instant to the next. This is the basis for having models with age, size, stage, and spatial structure. Additionally, there are different levels of ecological integration in biology, and each level tends to explain the next higher level. Population dynamics depend on the survival and reproductive rates of individual organisms. In this chapter, the authors discuss the importance of understanding consensus and highlight the contributions of the book. First, the book demonstrates that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the Court reaches consensus more often than not. In fact, a majority of the Court's decisions every term are unanimous or highly consensual. Second, the book explains the high level of consensus on the Court and does so by constructing a model reflecting the variety of forces that concurrently influence the Court's decisions. The model highlights how legal and attitudinal forces simultaneously influence the Court's decision making, and specifically presents a mechanism for capturing the level of uncertainty and ambiguity facing the justices with regard to the strongest legal answer in each case. Thus, the final contribution is that the book tests empirically whether the justices reach agreement when the legal answer is simply more obvious and clear. This concluding chapter evaluates the contributions of the strategic behavior model of black elite activism in the U.S. foreign policymaking arena. As this book illustrates, black leaders often take policy positions that stand in opposition to the goals that the governments of their ancestral homeland pursue in U.S. foreign policy. The chapter argues that the two-level games metaphor at the heart of the strategic behavior model sheds light on the behavior of the black elite in the U.S. foreign policymaking arena because it is clear that black leaders jealously guard their interests and those of their constituents in the domestic arena. This model, in addition, has broad applicability to other racial and ethnic groups. Finally, the chapter shows how this alternative theory also helps to resolve recent intellectual debates about the impact of transnationalism on U.S. foreign policy and the quality of black representation in U.S. politics. This chapter tests the Strategic Model of Terrorism. The Strategic Model posits that groups engage in terrorism because doing so increases the likelihood of achieving their political demands. Testing the efficacy of a tactic is challenging and there are trade-offs to every methodological approach. For this reason, the author presents several statistical approaches showing that groups lower the odds of government compliance when they engage in terrorism by attacking civilians. Terrorism negatively affects the odds of concessions even after taking into account the capability of the perpetrators, the nature of their demands, and the strength of government opposition. This information is invaluable for militant group leaders, forming the basis of Rule #1 to refrain from terrorism. Chapter 1 constructs the conceptual and theoretical framework for an analysis of relations among knowledge, policy, and expertise, drawing on research in political science, policy analysis, science and technology studies, and the environmental and interpretive social sciences. From this diverse and extensive literature, it distils four conceptualizations of knowledge-policy relations (linear-rational, strategic, cognitive, and coproductive) and considers the place of expert advice and advisory bodies within each. It introduces the main subject of investigation-the UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution-which advised governments on pollution and the environment for forty years until 2011. Key questions about policy learning, science and politics, and the role and construction of expertise are introduced, and the methods used in an extended study of the Commission are outlined. The latter included archival work, indepth interviews, documentary analysis, and participant observation -the author herself having been a member of the Commission for ten years.
Conclusion

Testing the Strategic Model of Terrorism
Constitutional Interpretation The processes by which constitutional meanings are determined raise normative and empirical questions. The normative questions are about the best methods for ascertaining the meaning of constitutional provisions. Justices, elected officials, and citizens dispute whether constitutional provisions should be interpreted consistently with the meaning of the text at the time the text was ratified, how one determines the meaning of the text at the time of ratification, and what was the meaning of particular constitutional texts at the time of ratification. The empirical questions are about whether persons when determining constitutional meanings actually rely on legitimate methods of constitutional interpretation or construction. Very prominent political scientists insist that constitutional decision-makers are interested only in making good policy. Constitutional arguments, in This chapter presents some preliminary evidence that terrorism does not pay politically in terms of pressuring government concessions. The author first came to this realization in the West Bank during the Second Intifada, when Palestinian terrorism backfired politically. His experience in the West Bank led the author to question and then probe whether terrorism helps the perpetrators to redress their grievances, as proponents of the Strategic Model assume. Although many scholars believe that groups turn to terrorism because of its political effectiveness, the author shows that this common assumption rests on a shaky empirical basis. His evidence that terrorism is a losing political tactic lays the basis for Rule #1 in the book-that aggrieved groups should refrain from targeting civilians.
